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Criminalizing Endangerment-A Comment
Marcelo Ferrante*
We often criminalize types of actions, at least partially, because
they cause or are likely to cause bad states of affairs, typically, harm
to others. In his article Criminalizing Endangerment,' Professor
Antony Duff proposes classifying offenses into two separate groups,
attacks and endangerments, depending on whether or not offenders
act with the intention to cause harm (or risk of harm).2 Roughly
stated, the rationale for the distinction between attacks and
endangerments is that each kind of offense expresses a distinctive
attitude toward the people or interests it harms (or threatens to harm).
This distinction marks a significant moral difference in that each
kind of offense instantiates a different kind of moral wrong.
Professor Duff articulates this difference as follows: whereas attacks
express "a practical hostility toward the interests or people" against
whom they are addressed,3 endangerments do not express such an
attitude. At most, they manifest only a certain degree of
indifference.4
The core of Professor Duff s argument is best described as the
conjunction of two separate theses. First, actions that equally cause
(risk of) harm to others instantiate different kinds of moral wrongs,
depending on whether or not such actions express an attitude of
hostility. (I will call this the thesis of attitudes as wrong-makers.)
Second, actions driven by the intention to cause (risk of) harm'
always express hostility, whereas actions not so guided never express
hostility. At most, they express merely indifference. (I will call this
the perfect correspondence thesis.) The conjunction of these two
theses yields that: 1) actions causing (risk of) harm that are
performed with the intention to cause such harm (or risk thereof) and
2) actions that are not guided by such intention but are otherwise
equal in effect to the former type of actions are instances of two
Copyright 2005, by R. A. Duff and Stuart Green.
* Assistant Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella School ofLaw (Buenos
Aires, Argentina).
1. R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, 65 La. L. Rev. 941 (2005).
2. See also R. A. Duff, Criminal Attempts 362-78 (1996) (proposing the same
distinction).
3. Duff, supra note 1 at 943.
4. Id. at 944-45.
5. The term "intention," as it figures in this thesis, does not encompass what
is often called "oblique intention." Duff, supra note I at 951. The term "harm,"
in turn, refers to harmful states of affairs that are bad, all things considered. For
instance, the surgeon who carries out an amputation that benefits the patient does
not cause harm. Id at 943.
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different kinds of moral wrongs. The categories of attack and
endangerment are meant to capture this distinction.6
If it is true that criminal laws should mirror the moral distinction
between attacks and endangerments, then Professor Duff s argument,
being correct, entails substantial implications for our current criminal
law practices. For instance, current legal definitions of criminal
offenses often disregard the contrast between causing harm with the
intention to cause it and causing harm with mental states other than
intention (e.g., knowledge or recklessness).7 These criminal laws
thus treat equally offenses that, according to Professor Duff s
argument, constitute different kinds of moral wrongs. If, however,
legal definitions of criminal offenses are to track moral differences,
we should modify our current practices so that actions driven by the
intention to harm and those not so driven are dealt with as offenses
of different types.8
Similarly, current criminal laws often stretch the mens rea
requirements for attempted liability to encompass not only actions in
which agents intend to bring about harm, but also those in which
agents only believe their conduct will cause harm.9 Professor Duff s
argument suggests that we should restrict the law of attempts to cases
of intention and leave the rest, if they are to be criminalized at all, to
some other form of inchoate liability." Again, the problem would be
that laws of attempts that have an overly broad scope blur the moral
difference between attacks and endangerments.
I believe there are good reasons for granting Professor Duff s first
thesis (the thesis of attitudes as wrong-makers). What I shall dispute
in this comment is Professor Duff s second thesis (the perfect
6. Duff's use of the terms "attack" and "endangerment" assumes that the
perfect correspondence thesis is true. "Attack" refers to harm-causing (or risk-
imposing) actions guided by the intention to cause harm and that express hostility;
"endangerment," in turn, refers to harm-causing (or risk-imposing) actions that are
not driven by the intention to cause harm and do not express hostility. Since I
contend that the perfect correspondence thesis is not true while conceding a version
of the thesis of attitudes as wrong-makers, my use of the terms "attack" and
"endangerment" will slightly diverge from Duff's. As I will henceforth use them,
"attack" will denote an action that causes (risk of) harm and expresses hostility,
while "endangerment" will mean an action that causes (risk of) harm but does not
express hostility. Accordingly, I will be able to meaningfully ask whether harm-
causing (or risk-imposing) actions driven by the intention to harm are always
attacks, or whether harm-causing (or risk-imposing) actions that are not guided by
the intention to harm could ever be attacks.
7. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.2(l)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when ... it is committed purposely or
knowingly.").
8. Duff, supra note 1 at 956-57.
9. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 5.01(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
10. Duff, supra note 2 at 29-32, 362-78.
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correspondence thesis), for I believe the alleged necessary
correspondence between, on the one hand, intending harm and
expressing hostility and, on the other hand, not intending harm and
not expressing hostility (only, at most, indifference) does not hold.
At the least, I believe it is more problematic than Professor Duff
suggests.
Section I of this comment states why I think we may grant the
thesis of attitudes as wrong-makers. Sections II and HI advance my
case against the perfect correspondence thesis.
I. ATTITUDES AS WRONG-MAKERS
Actions instantiate wrongness by virtue of descriptive properties
that they bear. We may call these properties wrong-makers, for
bearing them makes an action wrongful. "Harm to others" is a
wrong-maker: all other things being equal, the fact that an action of
mine will harm you makes my action wrongful. I ought not to
perform this action because it will harm you. Furthermore, harm to
others is an uncontroversial wrong-maker. Claiming otherwise
would commit us to an implausible view of morality under which the
harmful consequences of our actions are not relevant considerations
for deciding how to act.
In order for Duff's proposed moral distinction between attacks
and endangerments to hold, it must be the case that besides
performing actions that cause harm (or create risk of harm) to others,
the attitudes agents manifest through these actions also count as
wrong-makers. For, let us recall, the attitudes agents express toward
those they harm (or risk harming) distinguish attacks from
endangerments as wrongs of different kinds. This is in contrast to
their effects or causal character, in which attacks and endangerments
are indistinguishable. Thus again, what is peculiar to attacks is that
they express hostility whereas endangerments do not, though they
may express a degree of indifference.
In order to accommodate this distinction, we need a view of
morality which entails not only preventing bad consequences and
bringing about good ones, but also being sensitive to other forms of
regard. So-called "expressive" theories of morality offer such a
view. " These theories posit generally that according others their due
is not just a matter of avoiding harm or contributing to well-being,
but a question of holding and expressing through action the right sort
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and in Economics chap. 2
(esp. at 33-34) (1993); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1506-14
(2000); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1681-85 (1992).
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of attitudes. For instance, we owe our children more than a given
level of physical or economic well-being--we ought to love them;
caring for their welfare represents a part of this broader duty.
The duty not to harm others may be similarly analyzed. Our
claim that we are not to be harmed by others is thus part of a more
general claim that we be regarded as the kind of valuable beings we
actually are. Actions which are equally harmful in their causal
effects, then, can wrong their victims in different ways if they express
different forms of regard by those who perform them. If, say, I harm
you for the heck of it, I may wrong you in a different way than if I
harm you inadvertently, even though both actions may be
indistinguishable in terms of the risks they impose and the harms they
actually bring about. In harming you for the heck of it, I express my
view that the fact that you will be harmed gives me no reason at all
not to perform the action which harms you; I straightforwardly deny
that you have any value at all that may count against my whims-I
may harm you for no particular reason at all.
In these terms, then, we may thus claim that in regarding you as
such a valueless thing, I am violating your moral claim to be viewed
as intrinsically valuable. If I harm you inadvertently, however, it is
at most ambiguous whether my attitude toward you is as offensive as
described above. I may fail to accord you the value that is your due,
but I do not necessarily regard you as an utterly valueless thing that
I may harm at will and for no particular reason.
Professor Duff s proposed terminology of hostility and
indifference adequately characterizes the attitudes manifested in these
examples: 2 In intentionally harming you, I express hostility toward
you, for I straightforwardly deny you any value; in inadvertently
harming you I reveal a sort of indifference toward you, for I simply
do not care how or whether my behavior will affect you. A view of
morality that distinguishes between such attitudes when evaluating
the moral status of actions may lead to different judgments of
wrongfulness for one and the other action. In such a view, each
action instantiates a different kind of moral wrong by virtue of the
attitudes it manifests, hence the use of different terms to designate
these different wrongs: "attack" for the hostility-expressing wrong
and "endangerment" for the wrong that imposes harm or a risk of
harm without expressing hostility.
This sketchy argument shows why Professor Duff may plausibly
claim that the wrongness of actions stems in part from the attitudes
agents express in performing them, such that hostility-expressing
actions which cause harm or risk of harm are wrongful in a way that
12. Duff, supra note 1 at 943-45, 947-48, 950-5 1.
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otherwise equal but non-hostility-expressing actions are not. 3 To
this extent, we may grant Duff s thesis of attitudes as wrong-makers.
I. THE PERFECT CORRESPONDENCE THESIS
Duff s argument is completed by what I have called the perfect
correspondence thesis. According to this thesis, the two kinds of
moral wrongs captured by the terms "attacks" and "endangerments"
are perfectly correlated with features of the actions' intentional
structure. In particular, Duff contends, harm-causing (or risk-
imposing) actions guided by the intention to cause (risk of) harm
necessarily express hostility toward the persons or interests they are
addressed to, whereas harm-causing (or risk-imposing) actions that
are not guided by the intention to cause (risk of) harm never express
hostility; in cases of recklessness or negligence, they may express
some degree of indifference. 4
If true, the perfect correspondence thesis offers a simple way of
making our criminal laws reflect precisely the moral differences that
the notions of attack and endangerment purport to capture. These
concepts are, in Duff s terms, "thick" normative concepts: "concepts
that reflect not just the causation of harm, but the way, the context,
and the spirit in which harm is done."' 5 Devising our criminal law
rules to accurately reflect all the richness of the relevant moral factors
might be an extremely burdensome task, if attainable at all. The
perfect correspondence thesis, being true, solves this problem. It
identifies a relatively "thin" factor, the intention to cause (risk of)
harm, whose occurrence is invariably correlated with a richer factor,
the expression of an attitude of hostility, and whose absence is
invariably correlated with the absence of such a richer factor. We
could thus have our criminal laws track the relevant, thick kinds of
moral wrongs by avoiding clumping together, under the same legal
types of offenses, actions guided by the intention to cause the
relevant harm and those which are not thus guided-a fairly easy
task.
There are good reasons, however, for doubting the perfect
correspondence thesis. Harm-causing (or risk-imposing) actions
guided by the intention to cause harm and otherwise equal actions
that are not so guided may actually be understood as manifesting
equivalent attitudes toward the interests or people they harm or
threaten to harm. In particular, I will contrast actions performed with
the intention to cause a harm (H) as a means to achieving a non-
13. Id. at 945-46.
14. Id. at 943-45.
15. Id. at 947.
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harmful end (E) (which, according to the perfect correspondence
thesis, are always attacks)' 6 and otherwise equal actions, also
performed with the intention to produce E, in which the agent
foresees that H will obtain as a side effect (which, according to Duff,
are always endangerments, no matter how certain the agent may be
that her action will bring about H).7 If, as I will be arguing, these
actions do not necessarily express relevantly different attitudes
toward the interests or people they harm, then it must be the case that
they do not necessarily instantiate different kinds of moral wrongs by
virtue of the attitudes they express. Actions that thus differ in their
intentional structure but nevertheless express the same relevant
attitudes toward harm must both be either attacks or endangerments,
but this cannot be the case under the perfect correspondence thesis.
My strategy will not be to deny an analytical distinction between
intending harm as a means to a further end and foreseeing harm as a
side effect. Rather, the point I will make is that what allows this
distinction is unfit to mark a moral difference as significant as the
one that the categories of "attack" and "endangerment" may be
plausibly meant to capture.
Consider the following version of the examples Duff offers in
support of his claim that, unlike intending harm as a means,
foreseeing harm as a side effect does not express hostility."8
Intention: A wants to clear her view, which is blocked by her
neighbor's tree. The tree stands near the border between the
two properties but she cannot reach it to, say, cut it down.
So, she lights a fire on her own property that will spread to
part of her neighbor's property and, in its course, bum down
the tree. A foresees that the fire will also spread in the
opposite direction and bum down her own tree, which does
not block her view.
Foresight: B wants to clear his view, which is blocked by a
tree on his property. Due to where the tree stands, B cannot
reach it to, say, cut it down. So, he lights a fire that will
spread to where the tree stands and bum it down. B foresees
that the fire will also spread in the opposite direction, reach
his neighbor's property, and bum down a tree of his
neighbor's, which does not block B's view.
As these hypotheticals' titles suggest, only A intends to damage
her neighbor's property; B just foresees that as a side effect of his
16. Id. at 950.
17. Id. at 951.
18. Id. at 947. I have modified the facts of Duffs examples in order to
equalize all features other than the intent and foresight properties.
[Vol. 65972
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destroying his own tree, some damage to his neighbor's property will
result. To say that A intends to damage her neighbor's tree is to say
that the damage to the neighbor's tree plays a distinctive role in the
practical reasoning that leads A to act as she does: 9 ifA suspects that
her original plan might fail to destroy her neighbor's tree, she is
prepared to adjust her conduct so that she succeeds. For example, if,
when she is about to start the fire according to her original plan, A
realizes that unexpected wind conditions could prevent the fire from
spreading far enough to reach her neighbor's tree (even though it
would still reach her own tree), she will commit to adjusting her
original plan, say, by waiting for more favorable weather conditions.
This commitment is part of what it means that A intends to destroy
her neighbor's tree." Since, however, potential damage to B's
neighbor's tree does not play a comparable role in his practical
reasoning, that is, he is not thus committed to adjusting his plan if
equivalent circumstances arise, we may properly say that B does not
intend to destroy his neighbor's tree; he just expects to destroy it as
a side effect of burning down his own tree.
Having made clear what distinguishes these two cases, as regards
their descriptive properties, we may now turn to the issue of possible
moral significance. The challenge for the proponent of the perfect
correspondence thesis is to show that the difference between the
agents' practical reasoning reveals A to be hostile to her neighbor and
B to be only indifferent toward his neighbor. However, claiming, as
would Duff, that B, the agent in Foresight, is indifferent toward the
destruction of his neighbor's tree mis-describes B's attitude toward
that event. In fact, from B's perspective, destroying his neighbor's
tree is, in fact, necessary to B's own end of having a better view: if
B must destroy his own tree in order to have a better view, then,
given B's beliefs about where he sets the fire and the causal laws
governing how the fire spreads, the destruction of his neighbor's tree
is required.
Since B possesses a positive attitude toward his desired end
(having a better view), he must also have some sort of positive
attitude toward those events that, according to his causal beliefs, are
necessary occurrences on the way to his end. To suggest this positive
attitude another way,2' it would be good news for B that his
neighbor's tree burns down because it would be evidence that B's
plan has succeeded and he now has his desired end: a better view.
In this light, claiming that an agent has a positive attitude toward the
19. See Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason 140-43
(1999).
20. But see id. at 140, 191 n.6 (possible counterexample).
21. See Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself 221-22 (1995).
9732005]
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occurrence of an event seems to exclude that the agent is indifferent
toward the occurrence of that event. Rather, one is indifferent toward
the occurrence of an event if one has neither a positive nor a negative
attitude toward its occurrence.2 Hence, my claim that the attitude
manifested by the agent in Foresight is not indifference.
However, claiming that B is not indifferent toward the harm his
action brings about is perhaps not yet to claim that the attitude he
manifests in his action equals that expressed by A in Intention. One
might still argue that attitudes like B's, manifested in foreseeing harm
as a side effect, differ relevantly from those manifested in intending
harm as a means even though they are positive toward the harm. One
might posit that foreseeing harm as a side effect is not as offensive
toward the neighbor's interests as intending harm, for the following
counterfactual holds: if B could improve his view without affecting
his neighbor's tree, he might prefer that course of action rather than
burning down his own and his neighbor's trees. More precisely, B's
attitude, as revealed in the original hypothetical, is consistent with his
preferring to avoid harm, so we have no reason to deny he has that
preference. Of course, it must then also be true that the foregoing
counterfactual does not hold for A, the agent in Intention. And this
is not the case. As captured by the counterfactual, B's attitude does
not differ from that of A. A similar counterfactual holds for A as
well.23 Let me explain.
As described above, A intends to destroy her neighbor's tree just
as a means to having a better view. To say that an agent intends H
just as a means to E is to state something about the agent's reasons
for intending H, namely that the agent's only reason for intending H
is that H contributes to the occurrence of E.24 Whatever other
properties H might have, they play no role in the agent's motivation
to cause H. Accordingly, in Intention, A's only reason for burning
down her neighbor's tree is that it is necessary, under the
circumstances, to achieving her end of having a better view. So, if
the world were such that destroying her neighbor's tree was not
necessary forA to have a better view, because, say, she could remove
the tree without damaging it, she might prefer to do this rather than
destroy her neighbor's property. Her positive attitude toward the
intended harm, as revealed in the actual Intention scenario, is thus
consistent with her preference for a possible world in which she has
a better view and her neighbor's tree is not destroyed.
22. See Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality 170-71 (Oxford Univ. Press
1991) (having a positive attitude toward the occurrence of harm precludes being
indifferent toward it).
23. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 21 at 214-18; Horacio Spector, Autonomy
and Rights: The Moral Foundations of Liberalism 109-11 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 22 at 130.
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If sound, this argument indicates that the actions described in
Intention and Foresight may result from the agents' equivalent
dispositions concerning their respective neighbors. Both A and B
appear to regard their neighbors' property interests in the same
fashion. The attitude they manifest, call it hostility or something
else, is a positive attitude toward harm based on (and only on) the
perceived fact that H is necessary to achieving E. If A's action is
wrongful by virtue of the attitude it expresses, then B's action must
be equally wrongful. If A's action and B's action are thus equally
wrongful by virtue of the attitudes they express, it is then not true
that, all other things being equal, intending harm and not intending
harm necessarily manifest relevantly different attitudes toward harm.
It follows, that is to say, that the perfect correspondence thesis is
false.
There may be, however, a possible limitation to the argument I
have developed, based as it is upon the contrast between Intention
and Foresight.25 In those cases, it is assumed that both agents believe
the harmful outcome of their actions will necessarily occur as a
consequence of what they do. Under such conditions, the distinction
between intending harm as a means and foreseeing harm as a side
effect does not correlate with different attitudes toward the affected
interests. Yet, this attitudinal symmetry may disappear if the agents
believe that the harmful outcome is only a likely consequence of their
actions. In effect, if B believes that the fire he starts in order to bum
down his tree is only likely to spread and burn down his neighbor's
tree, B could consistently hope that this likely outcome would not
occur. If so, we cannot infer from B's actions that he does not so
hope. In contrast, the very fact that A intends to bum down her
neighbor's tree, though by a means that makes such event only likely,
seems to exclude the possibility that she can also hope the tree will
not be destroyed. Thus, when the harmful outcome is believed to be
uncertain, the action of the intending agent and the action of the
foreseeing agent allow different inferences as to the attitudes they
hold toward the interests they affect. While we can exclude the
possibility that the intending agent hopes harm will not result from
her action, we cannot exclude such a possibility in the case of the
foreseeing agent. Articulating this distinction as the contrast between
hostility and an attitude that does not amount to hostility, we can
plausibly find in these cases the two different kinds of moral wrongs
the notions of attack and endangerment are meant to capture.26 If all
25. See Bennett, supra note 21 at 224-25.
26. Duff states that the same inference holds in cases where the foreseeing
agent is certain of his causing the harmful outcome, and so claims that even in such
cases, foreseeing harm as a side effect involves less offensive attitudes than
2005]
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this were right, a qualified version of the perfect correspondence
thesis may hold true in which not only intending harm but also
foreseeing harm as a certain side effect are invariably correlated with
the expression of hostility, whereas other mental states, including
foreseeing harm as an uncertain side effect, would never express such
an attitude. In any event, it would still be the case that Duff s
(unqualified) perfect correspondence thesis does not hold.
III. AIMING AT EVIL
Duff seems to concede that in focusing, as I have done so far, on
the agents' dispositions to act in harmful ways, one may indeed
conclude that, all other things being equal, there are no relevant
attitudinal differences between intending and foreseeing agents.27
But, Duff s argument goes, if we reject the position that criminal
liability is to be grounded on these types of evaluations and focus on
the character of the actions actually performed, we could notice a
significant moral difference between actions guided by the intention
to harm (even as a means to a further end) and those that are not so
guided. The former type of actions, Duff writes, are "structured by
the intention to [harm];"2" they are "oriented toward and guided by
the wrong that that intention involves." 9 The latter type of actions,
in contrast, are "not thus structured by or oriented toward wrong."3
To complete the argument, that is, to explain why in letting one's
action being guided by harm one acts wrongly in a distinctive way,
31
Duff seems to resort to a well-known argument by Thomas Nagel:
[T]o aim at evil, even as a means, is to have one's action
guided by evil. One must be prepared to adjust it to insure
the production of evil: a falling-off in the level of the desired
evil becomes a reason for altering what one does so that the
evil is restored and maintained. But the essence of evil is that
intending harm as a means. Duff, supra note 1 at 951. Duff writes that the agent
who foresees that a harmful event will ensue with certainty "might wish or hope
that the harm would not ensue." Id. What does it mean, however, that the agent
might "wish or hope" that the harm will not ensue when she knows it necessarily
will ensue? This statement either makes no sense or refers only to the possibility
of the agent's preferring a possible scenario in which achieving her end does not
necessitate the harmful outcome. Yet, if Duffs statement refers to this second
possibility, then it refers to something that fails to distinguish intending as a means
from foreseeing as a side effect. My discussion of Intention and Foresight shows
that both actions are equally consistent with the agents having such a preference.
27. Id. at 947-48.
28. Id. at 945.
29. Id. at 948.
30. Id.
31. Id. at948n.19.
[Vol. 65976
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it should repel us. If something is evil, our actions should be
guided, if they are guided by it at all, toward its elimination
rather than toward its maintenance. That is what evil means.
So when we aim at evil we are swimming head-on against the
normative current. Our action is guided by the goal at every
point in the direction diametrically opposite to that in which
the value of that goal points.32
In brief, if there is some value (V) and some thing (7) that
instantiates V, the clearest mode of flouting V," as far as T is
concerned, is to intend the destruction of T.34 For, in Nagel's terms,
when we intend T's destruction, we aim at evil and thereby "swim
head-on against the normative current."35 In contrast, by doing evil
without aiming at evil, we still, presumably, flout V, though we do
so less clearly and thereby swim against the normative current, but
not head-on against it. Thus, because intending evil serves
distinctively as the clearest mode of flouting the relevant value, it
may serve as the basis for the proposition that intending evil, even as
a means, expresses a particular kind of moral wrongness different in
kind from (and more serious than) the wrongness of foreseeing evil
as a side effect of aiming at a non-evil goal.
Under this interpretation, Duff s argument hinges crucially on the
thesis that intending harm or evil is the clearest mode of flouting the
pertinent value. Were this thesis false, the subsequent argument that
finds in intending evil a distinctive kind of moral wrong should fall
as well. The question is, then, whether the first thesis is correct. I
contend that it is too narrowly framed. It leaves aside an important
dimension of acting (im)morally. Once this dimension is properly
accounted for, the case for intending evil as the clearest case of
wrongdoing loses its ground.
Recall the facts of Intention. In that case, A intends to destroy her
neighbor's tree. The state of affairs of the tree's being destroyed is
bad, an instance of evil, let us say. The reason the destruction of the
tree is evil is that it harms A's neighbor. Since A intends to destroy
her neighbor's tree and the tree's being destroyed is evil, if A aims at
producing this state of affairs, it then follows that she aims at evil.
However, the aspect of the intended state of affairs by virtue of which
it is evil (i.e., that it harms the neighbor), although being part of what
32. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 181-82 (1986). Duff refers to
a previous, but basically identical, version of it. See supra note 31 (citing Thomas
Nagel, The Limits of Objectivity, in 1 Tanner Lectures on Human Values 75,
131-35 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980)).
33.. I draw the concepts offlouting values and of there being different modes
of flouting them from Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 382-84 (1981).
34. Or, more accurately, intending T to stop being such that it instantiates V.
35. Nagel, supra note 32.
2005] 977
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A intends, does not figure among A's reasons for acting as she does.
Ex hypothesi, A's reason for burning down her neighbor's tree is that
it will clear her view. True, this action will necessarily harm her
neighbor, but this is not the reason why A bums the tree down. She
bums down the tree despite (rather than because) it will harm her
neighbor. This distinction suggests an even clearer case of flouting
the value of the neighbor's interest in his or her tree: the case in
which the agent intentionally bums down the tree because this will
harm the neighbor. In this case, not only does the agent aim at evil,
as A does in Intention, but she also takes what makes the intended
state of affairs evil (i.e., that it harms the neighbor) as her reason (or
one of her reasons) for bringing it about. We may say, using
Nozick's terms, that in the latter case the agent intentionally does evil
qua evil: her action does not merely coincide with wrongness, it
tracks wrongness.36 In Intention, however, A also does evil
intentionally but her action does not track wrongness, it just fits
wrongness.
In Kantian ethics, the moral action is such that the reason why the
agent does it and the reason why the action is right are the same." In
acting morally in this strong sense, not only does the agent do what
is right, she also connects herself with the value that makes her action
right. If I do what is right, even though for a reason other than that
by virtue of which my action is right, say, if I act for self-interested
reasons where rightness stems from the fact that my action furthers
others' interests, my action is still a right action even though it falls
short of the moral ideal. Even though I do the right thing, I fail to
connect myself to its pertinent value.
The contrast in the previous paragraph between pursuing
wrongness qua wrongness and just having one's action fit wrongness
involves a symmetric argument in the domain of acting immorally.
When I intentionally do what is wrong and take what makes it wrong
as my reason for doing it, not only do I act wrongly, I also connect
myself with wrongness in the same way as the Kantian moral agent
connects herself with value. If, in contrast, I intentionally do what is
wrong without tracking wrongness, like the agent in Intention, my
action is doubtless wrong but it falls short of the anti-ideal of
immoral conduct just as the self-interested action of my previous
example falls short of the moral ideal.
As Nagel claims in the above-quoted passage,38 it follows from
the very meaning of evil that we should not aim at it. Though true,
this is only part of the story. It also follows from the concept of evil
36. See supra note 33 at ch. 4.
37. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends chap. 2 (1996).
38. Nagel, supra note 32.
[Vol. 65
]MARCELO FERRANTE
that we should not take it as a reason for acting; we should not let our
actions track wrongness. If sound, my point shows that aiming at evil
is not the clearest mode of flouting the relevant value, for there is an
even clearer case, to wit, aiming at evil qua evil. To return to
Nagel's metaphor: only when we aim at evil qua evil do we swim
head-on against the normative current; in merely aiming at evil (as
the agent in Intention does) we certainly swim against the normative
current, though not head-on against it. Thus, my point amounts to a
rejection of Duff s argument for a distinction of moral wrongs that
depends on whether the agent intends to cause harm or not for he
grounds the difference on the distinctiveness of intending to cause
harm as the clearest mode of flouting the relevant value.
My point does not necessarily deny that, all other things being
equal, intending harm is somehow more wrongful than foreseeing
harm as a side effect. Indeed, my point is twofold: 1) For any case
of wrongdoing in which the agent intends to cause a harm H without
tracking wrongness, that is to say, without taking what makes that
action wrong as her reason for doing it, there is a possible case in
which the agent intends to cause H and tracks wrongness, that is to
say, takes what makes the action wrong as a reason for doing it. 2)
The latter case is the clearest case of flouting the value in relation to
which the action is wrong. Accordingly, there is room for the
argument that if the agent does not intend to cause H but only
foresees it as a side effect, her action would be farther from the
clearest mode of flouting the relevant value than the action guided by
the intention to cause H. The action would still presumably flout that
value, but in a less clear way.
Could this argument not ground Duff s proposal that we
distinguish offenses by whether they are committed with the intention
to cause harm or not? I think not. First, in order for Duff s proposal
to be warranted along those lines it should be the case that, for any
given evil state of affairs, intending it is always more wrongful than
foreseeing it as a side effect. Second, even assuming that, all other
things being equal, intending evil is more wrongful than foreseeing
evil as a side effect, it will still not be the case that, for any given evil
state of affairs, intending it is always more wrongful than foreseeing
it as a side effect.
Take the following example. In a war driven by fanatic ethnic
reasons, pilot (P) bombs some military facilities on the enemy's
territory. P foresees some civilian casualties as a necessary side
effect of the bombing. Even though P knows her action will kill
civilians of the rival ethnicity, she does not intend to kill them; she
aims to destroy the military facilities. P also believes, however, that
all members of the rival ethnicity deserve to die and this belief has
been crucial to her action: she would not be as willing to bomb the
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enemy's military facilities were it to affect civilians of any other
ethnicity. In other words, P's action is wrongful partly by virtue of
the fact that it will kill civilians of the rival ethnicity and this fact is
part of P's reasons for undertaking the bombing mission. P's action
of knowingly killing the civilians, then, is not guided by the intention
to kill them, but it tracks the wrongness of killing them.
This example shows that foreseeing harm as a side effect and
tracking the wrongness of the foreseen harm may appear together:
one may knowingly do evil as a side effect because it is evil. In turn,
the Intention scenario illustrates that an agent may intend to cause
harm and still fail to track the wrongness of that harm; one may
intend to do evil despite its being evil. On the other hand, the
argument I am considering assumes that the clearest mode of flouting
value involves intending evil because it is evil, therefore, all other
things being equal, intending evil is closer to that clearest case of
wrongdoing than simply foreseeing evil as a side effect. We should
likewise grant that, all other things being equal, doing evil because
it is evil is closer to the anti-ideal of immoral action than doing evil
despite its being evil. As the cases of the fanatic bomber P and the
Intention scenario show, intending evil (as opposed to foreseeing
evil) and doing evil because it is evil (as opposed to despite its being
evil) are independent properties: one may intend to do evil despite its
being evil (as in Intention) and knowingly do evil because it is evil
(as in the fanatic bomber case). The following graph displays these
possibilities:
Intending Intention Clearest mode of
evil flouting value
Foreseeing Foresight Fanatic bomber
evil
Despite it is evil Because it is evil
The vertical axis shows what we may call the aiming dimension
of flouting the pertinent value. Along this dimension, intending evil
ranks higher than foreseeing evil. The horizontal axis, in turn,
displays what we may call the tracking dimension, along which doing
evil because it is evil ranks higher than doing evil despite its being
evil. The clearest mode of flouting the pertinent value stands on the
upper-right region of the graph, implying that it involves the
conjunction of the top positions along the two dimensions. On the
lower-left region we find actions like that in Foresight in which the
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agent knowingly does evil despite its being evil. Actions driven by
the intention to do what is evil, like the action in Intention, are closer
to the anti-ideal than those standing on the lower-left region of the
graph. However, foreseeing evil as a side effect is no guarantee that
foreseeing agents could never get closer to the anti-ideal. Cases like
the fanatic bomber case show how this could occur.
In sum, once we allow for differences along the tracking
dimension of wrongness, we cannot claim, as Duff's proposal
requires, that, for any given evil state of affairs, intending it is always
distinctively more wrongful or closer to the anti-ideal of
wrongfulness than foreseeing it as a side effect.39 Duff s proposal,
then, loses its ground.
IV. CONCLUSION
Duff s argument would lead us to devise our criminal laws so that
harm-causing (or risk-imposing) offenses are treated differently
depending on whether they are committed with the intention to cause
(risk of) harm or not. The reason Duff advances in support of this
theory is that by intending harm, or in intending harm, offenders
manifest relevantly different attitudes toward the victims they harm
or impose risk upon. These differential attitudes, he argues, do not
just show offenders to be differentially culpable. Victims are
differentially wronged as a result. In section I, I sketched an
argument that may account for this latter thesis. I pointed out a
plausible view of morality under which actions may be
wrongful-they may wrong others-not only by virtue of the evil
consequences they impose on others, but also because of more subtle
forms of regard that harmful actions may reveal, particularly, on
account of the attitudinal dispositions they express.
In accordance with this view, I considered in section H whether
the intention/non-intention divide tracks such attitudinal differences.
I concluded that it does not because causing harm with the intention
to cause it and knowingly causing harm may manifest equivalent
attitudinal dispositions toward harm. Then, in section 11, I
considered the possibility that intending to harm when one aims at
the production of evil could mark the pertinent moral difference. I
argued that the view that could warrant such a difference fails to pay
heed to an important dimension of wrongness. Once that dimension
is properly taken into account, the distinctiveness of intending harm,
as a particular and more serious kind of moral wrong vanishes.
39. Unless an argument is made that differences along the aiming dimension
impact more heavily on the overall assessment of wrongness than those along the
tracking dimension-an argument, by the way, that Duff does not make.
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If my arguments are sound, we may have reasons for treating
harm-causing (or risk-imposing) offenses as different kinds of
wrongs depending on the attitudes offenders manifest through their
actions. Yet, it will not follow that we should make intending to
cause (risk of) harm the criterion by which the relevant classes of
cases are distinguished.
